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Abstract

impact. They can’t necessarily be steered around as
with threats like regional conflict or piracy.
Nonetheless, we argue the threat of cyberattack is
real and prompts us to answer several questions.
First, we ask how does cyberattack threaten the
global system of maritime enabled commerce?
Second, we investigate the cyber threat to maritime
system. In our third and last thrust of inquiry, we
attempt to identify what norms, standards, practices,
and law may be needed to protect the system of
global maritime commerce from cyberattack as well
as practical prescriptions for US public policy as well
as international policy.
Before moving on to discussion of international
security antecedents to cyber issues found in this
area, there is a matter of definitional housekeeping.
The authors prefer to use the term maritime system to
define the operational space in which shipborne and
port activities take place, principally for commercial
purposes. US Coast Guard (USCG) and Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) documents describe a
Maritime Transport System (MTS) that encompasses
much area where cybersecurity issues are to be found
in the maritime system, but not necessarily all of it.
DHS’s definition extends to ports and coastal
authorities but not necessarily ships plying the seas
far from US territory.
For centuries, states have pursued control of the
seas, often in competition or conflict with one
another. While two great powers, the United
Kingdom and the United States, have exerted much
effort to control the seas and allow for the free flow
of trade on the world’s oceans, other powers have
contested their (mostly) benevolent hegemony for the
seas [2]. Ahistorical perspectives on maritime
security are likely foolish while thinking about
cybersecurity issues as cyberattacks may well
achieve results previously ascribed to warships,
privateers, or pirates on the high seas.

This paper addresses the issue of cybersecurity in
the global maritime system. The maritime system is a
set of interconnected infrastructures that facilitates
trade across major bodies of water. Covered here are
the problem of protecting maritime traffic from attack
as well as how cyberattacks change the equation for
securing commercial shipping from attack on the
high seas. The authors ask what cyberattack aimed at
maritime targets – ships, ports, and other elements –
looks like and what protections have been emplaced
to counter the threat of cyberattack upon the
maritime system.

1. Introduction
International maritime operations remain a
primary vehicle of globalization. More than 80
percent of the world’s cargo is carried by ship. While
mobile phones and other small, lightweight, highlyvaluable items may go by air, almost everything else
traveling from continent-to-continent is transported
by maritime vessels. Shipping remains a fundamental
component to global trade, wherein ports large and
small serve as the departure and arrival point for
containerized, bulk, and liquid cargo.
Transport by ship has become a deeply automated
process in which computers are employed in
everything from navigation and propulsion to cargo
handling and customs. Increasingly, the computers
involved in maritime cargo operations are also
networked, largely employing the same protocols as
other Internet-based forms of communication [1].
This rise in networked computerization in ships and
in systems that support shipping from onshore
present new opportunities for malicious parties to
disrupt maritime commerce in ways that piracy and
open naval hostilities cannot.
Cyberattacks may be launched across global
distances and can have potentially devastating
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Disruption of shipping activity is often
fundamental component of naval conflict [3]. In both
world wars, submarine campaigns represented a
mortal threat to multiple powers, but not least the
island nations of the Axis and Allied coalitions. In
the Second World War, it could be argued that one
submarine campaign, Germany’s in the Atlantic,
ultimately failed, though at great cost to the Allies,
while another, the United States’ campaign against
Japanese merchant shipping, was a success. For
decades after the war, the United States and its
NATO allies prepared for a clash of naval forces and
doctrine in the North Atlantic.
There the issue was to what degree NATO’s
naval forces – surface ships, submarines, and aircraft
– could protect a massive reinforcement from North
America to Europe. It was assumed that the Soviet
Union would sortie hundreds of submarines and
surface warships to disrupt the Alliance’s maritime
link. How well the respective strategies of NATO and
the Soviet Union would have fared remains a welleducated guess, but few estimates were particularly
rosy with regard to the fortunes of merchantmen on
the North Atlantic in a potential war with the Soviet
Union [4]. Nonetheless, in 1986 Mearsheimer argued,
“the Navy‘s main value for deterrence lies in the
realm of sea control, where protection of NATO’s sea
lines of communication (SLOCs) might matter to
Soviet decision-makers contemplating war in
Europe” [5]
While no major war between East and West
came to pass between 1945 and 1989, regional
conflicts did have an impact on international
maritime commerce. Perhaps most important of them
was the closure of the Suez Canal from 1967 to 1975.
Shut at the onset of the June 1967 Six Day War,
Israeli and Egyptian troops faced off across the 120
mile-long waterway between the Mediterranean and
Red Seas until 1973’s Three Day War. The canal was
ultimately reopened as relations improved between
Cairo and Tel Aviv in 1975. The canal’s closure
increased the distance of a sea journey from Mumbai
to London from 6,200 nautical miles to more than
10,800 nm. Feyrer argues persuasively how closure
of Suez led to significant reduction in trade between
nations on either side of it [6, 7].
Despite being the last naval conflict of its kind,
the 1982 War over the Falkland Islands had minimal
impact on international seaborne commerce, during
the war between Iran and Iraq from 1980 to 1988
merchant ships involved in the export of oil from
both belligerents were attacked more 450 times [8].
Both sides sought to interdict their opponent’s
capacity to sell oil internationally thereby acquiring
funds to continue the war effort. US intervention in

the Persian Gulf during the conflict ultimately led to
the crippling of two warships, the Stark (hit by Iraqi
missiles) and Samuel B. Roberts (which struck an
Iranian mine). US protection of commercial shipping
illustrated that such duty remained dangerous and
unpredictable, however punitive attacks on Iranian
forces after the damaging of the Roberts largely
curtailed Iran’s capacity to harm US or allied
commercial vessels.
Absent major international conflict, disruption to
maritime commerce has arisen in new forms.
Somalia’s incapacity to exert control over her littorals
during the country’s slide to largely ungoverned
status in the 1990s led to a resurgence in maritime
piracy in the 2000s. Regional warlords and bandits
engaged in a significant piracy campaign, involving
the hijacking of dozens of vessels, some held for
periods of years for ransoms in excess of $1 million.
However, coordinated international response as well
as military operations onshore have had a desired
result of reducing the Somali pirate problem to a
negligible one [9].

3. Cybersecurity and the Maritime
System
When we think of piracy on the high seas, it is a
mostly unsophisticated endeavor. A few men, armed
with rocket propelled grenades and Kalashnikovs,
possessing boarding gear and a fast boat are usually
all that is needed to highjack a vessel displacing
50,000 tons or more (naval vessels excepted).
Ransoms for these hijacked ships has reached well
into the millions of dollars.
How cyberattack may disrupt shipping is
different. To get our arms around cyber threats, we
need to begin using some imagination as to what is
requisite for a pulling off a cyberattack that either
steals something of value or does damage to a
maritime vessel or other piece of infrastructure. The
authors like to consider the beginning point of
thinking about such attacks as the bad guy-ology of
the attacker.
What does this mean? When we speak of bad
guys in cyberspace, we are talking about people who
can act alone, in small groups or large ones,
supported or deployed by nation states or not. They
craft source code for sophisticated tooling, penetrate
computer networks, and do a lot of the same data
management work as most Internet enterprises
(servers, databases, means of communication, etc.)
also toil in [10].
We have witnessed reports of computer security
breakdown in the face of increasingly sophisticated
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attack for more than 20 years now. This has been
going on for a long time. Hackers and, equally
importantly, hacker groups have been around for a
while and they have evolved within both domestic
and international political spheres. They have power.
A former member of the Cult of the Dead Cow (cDc)
hacker organization ran a Democratic campaign for
one Texas’s US Senate seats in 2018.
Concurrently, there has been a convergence of
politics and cyberattack that extends from “kinetic”
hacks like the Stuxnet campaign launched against
Iran’s nuclear enrichment program and the
information warfare operation exemplified by the
email breach at the US Democratic National
Committee by foreign, state-supported hackers.
Those individuals, in the employ of Russia leaked
stolen data to the Wikileaks organization during the
2016 US Presidential election. Both these episodes
illustrate how important or impactful cyberattacks
have been and what breaks when they occur.
Thus when we begin thinking about cyber
vulnerabilities in the maritime sector, we need to
focus firstly on what happens when things break [11].
There is an exercise afoot in which mapping
vulnerabilities to components are linked to pieces of
information and computing infrastructure. We may
not need to worry about a pump that can only be
turned on by a human being, but one operated by
computer and interconnected by network, we do
worry about.
Where cybersecurity concerns come into play is
after identifying things that could go wrong, i.e. that
also are very detrimental to safety or continuation of
operation. There need to be many people thinking
about what can go wrong in shipping as with any
piece of critical infrastructure. It may seem simple,
but the computerization of it is not.
Furthermore, it must be reminded just how
important maritime trade is to the global economy
and what disruptions to it may produce in global
manufacturing or energy supply chains. Hopefully
this answers the question of why cybersecurity in the
maritime system is important. It’s important because
of how closely seaborne trade tracks with world GDP
and other economic indicators. Trade on the oceans
exceeds 10 billion tons per year [12]. With many
nations highly dependent on forms of import or
export, disruption of those flows could be potentially
useful to adversaries or enemies. In a time of
increased economic conflict, could the cyber weapon
not be employed against the maritime system? Of
course, and it already has.
The Stuxnet or Shamoon of the maritime system,
thus far is the cyberattack against Denmark’s MøllerMaersk, the world’s largest container ship operator.

But Maersk is not just the biggest in container
shipping, it also operates the ports themselves,
including the Port of Los Angeles, the busiest port by
container volume in the US. Maersk was also the
victim of the most expensive and destructive
cyberattack against any form of logistics company in
June 2017.
The company’s IT infrastructure was walloped
by the propagation of the NotPetya malware across
its computer networks. It was crippled by the attack,
which shut down port operations – cranes, gates,
freight forwarding instructions, and many, many
other processes, at 17 of the company’s 76 ports.
After the attack, “For days to come, one of the
world’s most complex and interconnected distributed
machines, underpinning the circulatory system of the
global economy itself, would remain broken” [13].
With Maersk’s woes as a backdrop, thinking
about the bad guy-ology of cyberattack in the
maritime system is shaped by two avenues for action.
First is beginning with a desired impact of an attack,
perhaps misidentifying cargo containers to facilitate
smuggling. The second relates to systems’ exposure
to attack and how vulnerabilities may be exploited to
produce a desired effect. So, we can start with two
general types of questions. One is, “If I want to
disrupt x with some form of cyberattack, how do I do
it?” But also important is, “If I can see a vulnerability
on resource y, what can I do with it?”
Returning to the Maersk case, it has been largely
judged to be a victim of a cyberattack spilling over
from the years’ long conflict between Russia and her
former sister republic, Ukraine. So the enormously
costly attack on Maersk was the collateral damage of
a Russian-sponsored attack on a country more than
1,500 kilometers from Maersk’s headquarters in
Copenhagen. So for as much damage and distress as
NotPetya visited upon Maersk, it wasn’t the intended
target. We are left to wonder what damage an attack
with some intent and planning might do to another
major shipper and operator of ports.
Moving forward, we need to chronicle the places
in which bad things can happen by cyber means and
categorize them to some degree. The apparent
dichotomy for maritime cybersecurity is a divide
between operations at sea and those undertaken while
in port. This is a useful distinction as the level of data
connectivity for ships at sea is far more constrained
than for other pieces of the maritime system
functioning at pier-side and further inland. While
ports and their IT infrastructure largely benefit from
connectivity to high-speed, backbone Internet
networks, ships at sea do not. They rely almost
exclusively on satellite connectivity to transmit and
receive data, and that connectivity is vastly
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expensive. But let us begin with the cyber issues
faced by ships at sea.

3.1 Cyber Issues for Maritime Vessels
Navigation by stars and sextant has been largely
abandoned by the world’s mariners. Most ships ply
the world’s sea lanes with the aid of three computerdriven systems: the automatic identification system
(AIS); the global positioning system (GPS); and the
Electronic Chart Display Information System
(ECDIS). These three systems are the pillars of
computerized navigation for merchant shipping
today.
“AIS is a non-encrypted transponder responsible
for transmitting course, speed, type of vessel, type of
cargo, at-anchor or underway status; and other
information for safety at sea” [14]. AIS transponders
have been required of ocean-going vessels since
2002, however the functionality of AIS has been
subverted for a variety of purposes. Substantial
evidence exists that Iran switches off AIS
transponders to facilitate sanctions evading behavior
in its export of crude oil. North Korea also allegedly
disables AIS ostensibly to allow its merchant vessels
a greater degree of latitude in avoiding sanctions.
Also important to maritime navigation is GPS.
Its use makes navigation on the high seas far more
accurate and simple than ever before. As long as a
merchant vessel can communicate with satellites of
GPS system, its location can usually be pinpointed
within a few meters. GPS is also employed in
military targeting, and as a result, measures able to
confuse, block, or spoof GPS signals have appeared.
The US Coast Guard issued an alert regarding a 2015
incident in which a loss of GPS connectivity to
multiple ships departing a non-US port occurred. In
2017, multiple vessels observed degradation and loss
of GPS connectivity while sailing in the Black Sea.
Of all the systems of concern with regard to
cyberattack, perhaps none is more worrisome than
ECDIS. As it is a system that interfaces with
navigational gear, sensors, and control systems for
driving the ship, ECDIS represents a highlydangerous target to cyberattack. Even bad ECDIS
data is a significant issue. The US Navy minesweeper
Guardian was severely grounded off the Philippines
in 2013 largely due because, “leadership and watch
teams relied primarily on an inaccurate Digital
Nautical Chart (DNC) coastal chart during planning
and execution of the navigation plan” [15]. In
addition, multiple cybersecurity and maritime
publications have reported on ECDIS’s susceptibility
to manipulation by unauthorized parties, possibly
leading to grounding or collision.

In addition to the major navigational systems
present aboard contemporary merchant vessels, there
is an enormous amount of automation in shipboard
operations. Contemporary cargo vessels, including
the largest ones, have automated away large numbers
of crew. Large merchant vessels displacing upwards
of 100,000 tons are now operated by crews as small
as 10 persons or less. The computer systems that
replace crew members are process control systems,
often provided by automation firms servicing
multiple sectors.
One of them is Schneider Electric, a French firm
that offers products in no less than 11 merchant
shipping applications. Schneider’s products are
germane to this paper as its Triconex® brand of
process control software is widely-utilized in
industrial applications in a variety of sectors.
Unfortunately, it was also allegedly compromised by
a cyberattack in a petrochemical facility in Saudi
Arabia. Shipboard systems likely contain a
significant number of vulnerabilities, and while they
can’t be attacked in the way cable- and fiber-based
networks are, there are plenty of other avenues for
attack, including by insiders in a constant churn of
crew turnover.

3.2 Cyber Issues in Port Operations
While ships at sea present a peculiar case in what
may be considered operational technology (OT)
cybersecurity, operations on land are quite different.
While shipboard systems may largely be
disconnected while at sea, port systems are largely
interconnected and often widely exposed to the
Internet. And what complicates their cybersecurity
even more is that ports are incredibly heterogenous in
ownership,
operational,
and
technological
composition. Coast Guard port inspectors reputedly
quip, “If you’ve seen one port, you’ve seen a port.”
Ports are often owned by local or regional
governments, operated by a commercial operators,
and served by myriad firms and offices who make the
port work. Consider the Port of Houston, one of the
nation’s largest, and the most energy-related port in
the United States (more on that later). Along the 52mile Houston Ship Channel is the Port of Houston
and its Port Authority (PHA), a mix of publicly- and
privately-operated shipping terminals, and other port
facilities, 150 different ones in total. It is home to the
second and third largest oil refineries in the US and
considered the primary energy port in the country.
Some 260 million short tons of cargo and more than
two million twenty-foot equivalent cargo containers
passed through it in 2018.

Page 1960

It is also a very highly automated and networked
port. And at the core of the digital operations is
something called Navis. Navis is an interconnected
suite of software;
[D]esigned to manage all facets of terminal and cargo
operations; it employs, among other things, optical
character recognition to scan cargo and manage its
movement. When cargo exits the port by truck or rail,
not only does NAVIS [sic] electronically log the cargo
out and thus simultaneously functioning as part of
PHA’s security access control system, it also generates
billing invoices for PHA. PHA’s gantry cranes, fuel
farms, and even its HVAC systems are networked
[16].

Thinking like a good bad guy, if so much of the
Port of Houston’s daily operations are largely
dependent on the Navis software, then that is
probably also an excellent target if the aim is to steal
from or disrupt the port. Has Navis been
compromised or been found vulnerable? Yes, in
2016, a SQL-injection flaw (a vulnerability found in
a database service) was found in Navis software. The
US Department of Homeland Security’s now defunct
Industrial Control Systems–Computer Emergency
Response Team (ICS-CERT) reported a previously
unknown vulnerability and Navis released a patch for
it. The vulnerability could have been exploited by a
novice attacker [Q].
Navis has published a library of white papers on
enhancing port efficiency. They have titles like A
New Frontier: Business Intelligence, Big Data & the
Impact on the Global Supply Chain and Port of the
Future: A Sense of Wonder. None of its white papers
cover the topic of cybersecurity.
Although Navis and other port system software
may have a central role in operations, the systems of
many companies and government agencies also
interconnect at major ports like Houston. These
organizations run email systems, web servers,
databases, and all manner of OT systems having to
do with port operations. Some of the firms
participating in port operations are among the largest
corporations or conglomerates in the world, but
others are far smaller.
What this means is that getting all the actors
involved in the operation of a large US cargo port to
adopt a framework or set of practices regarding
cybersecurity is difficult. As the Maersk cyberattack
illustrated, the loss of even one major firm’s system
at a large port may bring operations to a screeching
halt. Of course there are many things that may occur
to disrupt port operations.
Again, port cybersecurity is different than ship
cybersecurity. The targets aboard ships that bad guys

care most about are likely those related to navigation
and propulsion, both highly automated in
contemporary merchant vessels. But in ports, there
are many more points of entry to interconnected port
systems. Modern port systems talk to railroad
systems, and Navis has software, “to automatically
route railcars to hub assignments and plan train load
sequences” [17].
What this amounts to is a scenario in which the
purveyors of port operations computer software and
automation drive to enhance interoperability and
operational efficiency as their primary activity. This
drive for efficiency is acceptable, however,
automation rife with cyber vulnerabilities may be
exploited by malicious actors. Such exploits must be
countered by law, policy, and technology. How
government and the private sector cooperate on
preventing cyberattack is critical to the ongoing
function of the global maritime system.

4. Law, the Sea, and Cyberspace
A fundamental issue pertaining to the law in sea
is the concept of jurisdiction or the power of a court
or locale to regulate persons, objects, or conduct
under their law. Because the world’s oceans are
international, there is an issue of who has jurisdiction
in matters occurring on the oceans. The United
Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS)
attempts to establish a legal framework for the
peaceful, cooperative use of the seas. UNCLOS
replaced other UN initiatives with this framework.
UNCLOS binds only those member countries of the
UN and establishes jurisdiction for each country as
12 nautical miles (13.8 miles) from the coastline with
a 200-mile exclusive economic zones.
However, multiple countries claim jurisdiction
based on their own laws. United States Law, for
example, claims that the:
Special territorial and maritime jurisdiction of the
United States includes: (1) The high seas, any other
waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction
of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any
particular State, and any vessel belonging in whole or
in part to the United States or any citizen thereof, or to
any corporation created by or under the laws of the
United States or of any State, Territory, District, or
possession thereof, when such vessel is within the
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United
States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular
state. [19]

The issue of jurisdiction is especially
problematic when it comes to cyberattacks. Does
jurisdiction refer to the originating nation of the
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attacker? The nation of the target? What is a nation is
used as an intermediary in the attack? Can multiple
nations claim jurisdictions? Unfortunately, the
current status of the law remains fragmented with
attempts to re-use existing laws and regulations into
cyber attack scenarios the challenges to our current
civil law framework and in more particular our
maritime law legal framework center upon the
application of existing legal concepts. This general
lack of jurisdiction over hackers presents another
issue. What if the damage from the cyberattack is not
physical and the lack of physical damage arising
from a successful Information Technology (IT)
environment cyberattack are legal issues difficult to
place within our current civil law framework. In
short, the lack of physicality in an IT environment
cyberattack presents challenges to our existing civil
law framework.
Another attempt to regulate internationally is
with the Tallinn 2.0 Manual for International Law
Regarding Cyber Operations [20]. The title of this
document is problematic. First, it is not international
law but rather an attempt by NATO to define rules
regarding cyber operations binding among NATO
countries. Secondly, the term “cyber operations” is
misleading as, on its face, it seems to mean
transactions related to cyberspace, but in reality is
synonymous with cyberwar.
The Tallinn Manual establishes a basis for
sovereignty, due diligence, jurisdiction, and
international responsibility and these uses this basis
to prescribe laws for air, sea, and space. Its chapter
on the Law of the Sea promulgating ten rules based
on the recognized 200-mile economic zone. Both the
Tallinn Manual and UNCLOS are limited based on
their ability to control the members of their
respective groups. As cyberattacks become more
common against maritime assets, it will be up to the
international courts to determine the effect of
regulations and laws, and if these courts actually have
the power to regulate.

from US national policymaking bodies as well as
international organizations and associations.

5. Relevant Public Policy

The US Coast Guard’s strategy heavily
emphasizes risk management. This makes a great
deal of sense, as shippers and other operators in the
maritime system have a long history of managing risk
and employing insurances to mitigate risk of loss
(UK insurer Lloyd’s has been in operation since
1686).
The Coast Guard’s strategy rests on two legs: (1)
assessment of risk through promotion of cyber risk
awareness and management; and (2) prevention via
the reduction of vulnerabilities in the MTS. This
strategy is likely in need of revision, it was released

As mentioned above, protection of the maritime
system in the wake of the September 11 attacks on
the United States and elsewhere has largely been
aimed at protecting the physical security and integrity
of cargo operations. Planning in port and shipboard
security has largely been aimed at thwarting terror
threats (smuggling of nuclear weapon or radiological
components, other weapons, piracy, etc.) not cyber
ones. That said, cybersecurity, or at least
cybersecurity risk management has received attention

5.1 US Cyber Security Policy Guidance
In the United States, there are sixteen critical
infrastructure sectors. These sectors cover cyber as
well as physical security. The cybersecurity of ships
and ports falls under the DHS’s Transportation
Systems Sector (TSS). That sector covers not only
maritime issues, but also highways, rail, aviation,
pipelines, and postal operations. The TSS plan was
released by DHS in 2015. It covers a great number of
industries, and identifies the Coast Guard as the lead
agency for maritime safety and security, including
cybersecurity. This status is the point of origin
cybersecurity strategy produced by the USCG. In
addition, the US Maritime Administration (MARAD)
maintains an Office of Maritime Security which has
added cybersecurity to its portfolio.
Establishing the path for securing systems
relevant to maritime operations from cyberattack has
become a priority in the US. US policy on
cybersecurity for the MTS is still developing, but was
outlined in the US Coast Guard Cyber Strategy. The
strategy rests on three pillars: defending cyberspace;
enabling operations; and protecting infrastructure.
That final piece is where the Coast Guard places the
MTS mission, stating:
Maritime critical infrastructure and the MTS are vital
to our economy, national security, and national
defense. The MTS includes ocean carriers, coastwise
shipping along our shores, the Western rivers and
Great Lakes, and the nation’s ports and terminals.
Cyber systems enable the MTS to operate with
unprecedented speed and efficiency. Those same
cyber systems also create potential vulnerabilities. as
the maritime transportation Sector Specific agency (as
defined by the national infrastructure protection plan),
the Coast Guard must lead the unity of effort required
to protect maritime critical infrastructure from attacks,
accidents, and disasters [21].
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in 2015, and it’s concrete objectives – risk
assessment tools and methodologies; cybersecurity
information sharing; cyber vulnerability reduction;
and cybersecurity education and training – align with
the early stage of cybersecurity development found in
the maritime system.
5.2 International Cybersecurity Guidance
Beyond US policy, the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) also has begun to stir in
approaching the issue of how cybersecurity impacts
its role at the UN specialized agency concerned with,
“the global standard-setting authority for the safety,
security and environmental performance of
international shipping.” The IMO issued guidance on
maritime cyber risk management in 2017 [22]. It
detailed eight areas of where vulnerable systems can
be found, including:
▪ Bridge systems;
▪ Cargo handling and management systems;
▪ Propulsion and machinery management and
power control systems;
▪ Access control systems;
▪ Passenger servicing and management
systems;
▪ Passenger facing public networks;
▪ Administrative and crew welfare systems;
and
▪ Communication systems.
The IMO’s primary tools for guidance emanate
from other bodies including: The Guidelines on
Cyber Security Onboard Ships; the International
Organization for Standardization and International
Electrotechnical Commission ISO/IEC 27001
standard on security techniques; and the US National
Institute for Standards and Technology’s Framework
for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity.
While the latter two documents are applied broadly to
many areas of commercial activity, the Guidelines on
Cyber Security Onboard Ships (GCSOS) is a much
more specific one and deserves greater attention.
Where the USCG has hung its hat on a strategy
for cybersecurity in the MTS, GCSOS is an attempt
to move toward an industry guidebook for securing
shipboard systems. Therefore it draws significant
attention on a set of initiatives that can protect
maritime activity. It represents the combined work of
nine major associations involved in maritime
shipping and transport. Furthermore it is focused on
the cybersecurity of ships, not ports.
The GCSOS is a seven part document that may
be best described as a handbook on cybersecurity
related to ships engaged in commercial activity. It

identifies
the
primary
concern
cybersecurity to be found in this area:

regarding

As technology continues to develop, information
technology (IT) and operational technology (OT)
onboard ships are being networked together – and
more frequently connected to the internet.

The document also identifies the two major areas
of concern regarding a cyberattack upon a ship; its
navigation and propulsion systems. Without those
functioning properly, safe shipboard operations can’t
be guaranteed [23].
Because the GCSOS is essentially a handbook or
perhaps even a primer, it covers the full gamut of
cybersecurity issues from threats to response and
recovery in a relatively brief document. Nonetheless,
it stands as significant contribution to cybersecurity
in the maritime system. Moving beyond the primer
phase of cybersecurity in the maritime system will
necessitate new approaches and investments, detailed
in the final section of this paper.

6. Conclusion and Prescriptions
Maritime cybersecurity has been identified as an
issue of some importance in the global cybersecurity
agenda. It does not rank as high as energy or power
issues, nor have the maturity of corporate and
government response found in the financial sector,
but it is on the agenda.
We see the state of maritime cybersecurity as
this. There is some emphasis on ships, but less on
ports, and less still on things connected to ports. All
matter and with many, many points of connection to
port systems, establishing international, industrywide standards will likely require extensive
coordination
and
expenditure
of
intellect.
Nonetheless, activity can be undertaken to secure the
maritime system by policy and through educational
endeavor.
6.1 Directions for Public Policy
Obviously maritime cybersecurity issues are
inherently international or global in nature. Their
remedy will require an investment by stakeholders in
both government and the maritime industry with
significant input from players in shipbuilding,
maritime operations, port activities, and other
functions that may be found in the maritime system.
If mere regulation was the answer to
cybersecurity issues in this area of endeavor or any
other, the job would be one from policymakers alone.
Regulation will be only a part of the process of
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increasing cybersecurity capacity. Nonetheless, when
useful frameworks, guidance, rules, and international
law may be promulgated, they should be. We just
need to be cognizant of the rapid change that may
occur as a result of technological innovation. It may
be difficult to forecast the future vulnerabilities
produced, but certainly this does not constitute a pass
for policy action.
Policymakers concerned with addressing the
cybersecurity issues to be found in the maritime
system must recognize that a workforce of experts in
cybersecurity able to address the issues faced by
shipping lines, naval architects, automation software
developers, or port operators will need to be created
and grown. Its beginnings will stem from the tiniest
of cadres now extant.
The maritime cybersecurity workforce will be
composed of professionals who understand the
programming and operation of computer systems as
well as having an understanding of the multiple areas
of expertise found across the maritime system. For
instance, addressing issues in ship propulsion systems
requires skills in both the operations of those systems
as well as the cybersecurity problems that arise in
their development and operation. The same would be
true of systems for tracking cargo or navigation.
6.2 Research and Education
The workforce issue will necessitate training and
education of varying depths. Some professionals will
no doubt receive cybersecurity education and training
at mid-career while others, if demand is sufficient,
will enter the workforce with specialist degrees
combining maritime and cybersecurity curriculum.
At a deeper level, experts from industry, government,
and academia may well need to collaborate around
centers for interchange of expertise and research
activity. This is already present in cyber activities for
everything from the power grid to the banking
system.
In the United States, a maritime cybersecurity
research and development capability should be
established along the lines of Department of Energy
(DOE) cybersecurity organizations across its
infrastructure of national labs. Considerable
investment has been undertaken by the DOE in
cybersecurity for the electricity power grid as well as
other process control systems. DOE has made
considerable investment at its Idaho National Lab
(INL) in cybersecurity for Supervisory Control and
Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, found in all
manner of industrial applications.
Both DHS and MARAD have grants programs in
place for enhancing security of the MTS and ports.

One official with whom we discussed this paper
described one of the DHS program’s outcomes being
multiple sales of updated fireboats to major ports.
This was verified in our research of DHS granting
activity. How government funding can be coupled
with industry initiatives should be another area for
activity in the cybersecurity of the maritime system.
Few areas of critical infrastructure are more ripe
for strategy and investment related to cybersecurity
protection than the maritime system. In addition,
research should be undertaken on the protection of
computer systems in both shipboard and port
operations so that cyberattacks will be less damaging
or debilitating to maritime trade.
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